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bstract: In this paper, I argue for the
following conclusions. First, quotas
are not normative goals in themselves,
but only a means to achieve non-discrimina-
tory selection procedures. Second, in a democ-
racy quotas are most plausibly used as a means
to fill offices in those bodies which have a major
impact on how well interests or discourses are
translated into policy. Third, quotas for the
young can be justified since, due to demo-
graphic development, their discourses tend to
be marginalised. Fourth, youth quotas cannot
be a means to ensure long-term policy-making,
but they can enhance the legitimacy of long-
term impacts from policy decisions taken today. 
The problem
In an insightful comparative study, Peter
Vanhuysse showed that many OECD coun-
tries, especially developed democracies, score
rather badly with regard to the demands of
intergenerational justice.1These democracies
not only score badly on factors such as ab-
solute child poverty, or child poverty in re-
lation to old-age poverty, but also have a bad
score on the public debt they leave per child
and their ecological footprint. Although this
study is comparative and allows for no ab-
solute measures, it shows that democracies
tend to favour the interests of older age-
groups and have a tendency for unsustain-
able policy decisions. 
If we follow Dennis F. Thompson, these
findings can be explained by four more the-
oretical reasons.2 First, there is the human
tendency to prefer immediate gains to those
in the far future. In consequence, it is more
probable that, in democracy, policy deci-
sions showing immediate measurable results
will be taken, with a rather short-term per-
spective. Second, policy decisions should be
responsive to the judgements of citizens
about the effects of laws on their interests.
As a consequence, there is a tendency that a
democracy will only accept policies which
correspond, in at least a minimal sense, to
the (potentially short-term) interests of the
currently living. Third, political power is
temporal; short election cycles are necessary
to avoid autocracy. Thus, democracies pro-
vide an incentive structure favouring short-
term policy with immediate gains for the liv-
ing because these enhance the chance of
staying in political power. Fourth, in democ-
racy there is a tendency to favour older age
groups and their interests, which leads to a
focus on present needs that neglects ensur-
ing similar benefits for the future. This rea-
son can be substantiated empirically. Due to
demographic development, the old are in-
creasing their majority in democracies,
which leads to the consequence that they
have more voting power and are better rep-
resented in the political bodies. Accordingly,
policy decisions tend to be biased towards
the interests of the older members of the
population.3
In the light of anticipated environmental
disasters, especially the impacts of climate
change, this tendency of democracy to
short-term decisions becomes a problem,
since the negative impacts of these decisions
will have to be borne by those who today are
young (let us say those who are under 25 or
30 years old). To counteract this tendency,
one can imagine three different ways to
change decision-making processes in democ-
racies, either to ensure more sustainable pol-
icy-making or to shift political power from
the old to the young. First, one could intro-
duce institutions to represent future genera-
tions. Thompson, for instance, proposes
trustees to secure the possibility of democ-
racy in the future. The role of these trustees
would be either to fill specific seats in the
legislative assembly or to be part of a com-
mission. In both cases, their task would not
be to propose new policies but to voice the
interests of future generations and to chal-
lenge those policy decisions which seem to
undermine the democratic capacity of future
generations.4,5 Second, the voting system
could be adjusted. As a consequence of his
research, Vanhuysse argues in line with oth-
ers that the time might have come to intro-
duce proxy votes for parents. Each parent
should receive an additional half-vote per
child.6,7 Such a system would shift the voting
power from the old to the young and might
have as an effect that political parties would
try to change their programmes in a way to
cope better with family interests and perhaps
with sustainable policy-making. Third, one
could introduce quotas for the young in rep-
resentative, executive, judicative or admin-
istrative bodies in democracy.
Analysing each of these three ways to coun-
teract democracy’s tendency to short-term
policy-making needs a paper-length discus-
sion. In this paper, I will only be concerned
with the last of the three proposals. My aim
is to answer the following two questions. 
(1) Can quotas be justified as a democratic
means to secure better representation of the
interests of the young? (2) Are youth quotas
an effective means to ensure that decisions
are taken with the degree of attention to en-
vironmental sustainability issues that they
demand? I will answer the first question with
a qualified “Yes!” Although quotas may be
justified to secure the proportional political
representation of the young in the wake of
demographic development, what I call “po-
litical affirmative action programmes” – the
weakest form of quotas – are better suited to
securing the political power necessary for the
young to decide on the future they will have
to face.8 The second question I will answer
with a qualified “No!” Since there is a
human tendency to favour immediate gains
over ones that are more distant in time, it is
implausible to believe that the young will
fare better than the old. But ensuring more
adequate representation of the young en-
hances the legitimacy of the long-term im-
pacts of policy decisions taken today. Those
who have to face the consequences should
be appropriately included in the decisions
taken.
To answer my two questions more fully, we
first need to know what quotas are and what
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they can achieve. In the second section, I
will introduce quotas as they have been dis-
cussed in political theory with regard to the
principle of equality of opportunity. I argue
that quotas can only be justified as a means
of reaching less discriminatory selection pro-
cedures for social positions, but that they
cannot be justified as a normative goal in
themselves. We also need to be clear about
the role quotas could probably serve within
a democratic institutional framework. In the
third section, I show under what conditions
quotas can be justified in democracy as a
means of achieving proportional representa-
tion of all the different interests in society.
These clarifications allow section four to an-
swer the question of whether quotas for the
young can be justified in democracy. An-
swering this first question enables us to
move on in section five to my second ques-
tion, whether youth quotas can be an effec-
tive means to secure environmentally
sustainable policy-making. 
What are quotas and what can quotas
achieve?
The 1970s witnessed a heated debate not
only among politicians but also among po-
litical theorists about whether and on what
grounds quotas can be justified in the job
market and the educational system. This
question has often been dealt with as if quo-
tas were either a normative goal in them-
selves, or necessary to understand the
principle of equality of opportunity.9 I op-
pose both these understandings of quotas.10
Instead, I argue in this section that quotas
can only be understood as a means either to
realise equality of opportunity or to serve a
goal beyond non-discriminatory selection
procedures.
Selection procedures for jobs, educational
places, or social positions more generally al-
ways discriminate, since from the pool of
candidates they select the number of indi-
viduals needed to fill the positions in ques-
tion. According to a formal understanding
of equality of opportunity, such discrimina-
tion is justified under the condition that
only characteristics of candidates who are
suitable are considered to fill the position
under consideration. In other words, only
those characteristics of candidates which en-
hance the prospect of successful perform-
ance of a social position should be taken into
account.11 All other criteria which might
play a role in selecting candidates are a form
of unjustified discrimination. Women, for
example, are unjustifiably but not explicitly
equality of opportunity is only realised if a
proportional distribution of social positions
on all social strata of society occurs. To make
this presupposition more concrete and not
to use a probably biased language, it is use-
ful to have a closer look at the famous ex-
ample of a warrior society introduced by
Bernard Williams.15 
Imagine a society in which high prestige is
attached to the status of warrior. Tradition-
ally, these warriors have been selected from
certain wealthy families of society but not
from the poor majority. Such a procedure of
selection is certainly unjustifiably discrimi-
natory against the poor majority if we pre-
sume that wealth and membership of a
certain class of families is irrelevant to per-
forming well as a warrior. It would be more
appropriate, Williams suggests, to introduce
a competition to test the physical strength
of those who want to be warriors. If such a
selection procedure is adopted and no ex-
plicit or implicit unjustified discrimination
against the majority of society occurs, then it
is reasonable to assume that after some time
the warrior class will consist of members of
the wealthy families and of the poor major-
ity in proportion to their number in society.
However, as O’Neill has already noted, there
are two difficulties involved in this argu-
ment.16 First, it may not necessarily be the
case that members of both parts of society
have the capacity to develop the equivalent
attributes required to be successful in the
competition. From an egalitarian point of
view, it would certainly be objectionable to
depend on wealth, social class, religion or
ethnic differences to justify unequal capacity.
However, differences in wealth and social
circumstances can become relevant for how
well people are able to develop their natural
talents. A wealthy family can provide better
training, equipment and assistance. Social
circumstances can be more or less support-
ive. These are reasons to justify a more sub-
stantive understanding of equality of
opportunity. But this understanding – most
commonly, according to Rawls, called fair
equality of opportunity17 – does not justify
quotas in a rigid sense. It only denotes the
conditions which must be secured for all to
have a fair chance of success at the outset of
the competition. What must be ensured is
discriminated against by selection proce-
dures which demand that one must have
worked without any breaks for the last five
years in the company to gain a position in
management. This discriminates against all
those women who are of child-bearing age.
Furthermore, as Mary Anne Warren argues,
such selection procedures reinforce social
structures which expect women to stay at
home and maintain the household.12
Understanding equality of opportunity in
this way allows us to expect that, if formal
equality of opportunity is fully realised for
the educational system and the job market,
then both genders and all different ethnical,
religious and other social groups are pro-
portionally represented in all different kinds
of social positions. Put differently, assuming
that a society can be divided into different
social and economic strata to which specific
social positions are attached, then members
of all different social groups in a society with
full formal equality of opportunity fill posi-
tions in proportion to their number in the
society as a whole. 
Such an understanding of equality of op-
portunity has been proposed most explicitly
by Onora O’Neill. According to her, the
fairest selection procedure is a lottery, since
in a lottery all have equal chances of success.
Thus, to be a fair procedure of selection,
equality of opportunity should guarantee
equal chances of success in education and
the job market.13 As a consequence, nothing
other than proportional representation of
both genders and all social groups in all so-
cial positions attached to the different socio-
economic strata of society can result. 
To ensure that such a proportional distribu-
tion of social position is the case, O’Neill
proposes to reformulate the principle of
equality of opportunity more substantially.
Equality of opportunity should be under-
stood as demanding that social positions be
divided between all social groups of society
in a proportional way.14 This understanding
of equality of opportunity establishes a first
and strongest understanding of quotas: rigid
quotas. Rigid quotas demand that educa-
tional places and jobs are distributed in a
strictly proportional way. Such an under-
standing of quotas presupposes that unjusti-
fied discrimination is in place and that
Equality of opportunity is an 
equal opportunity to prove unequal
talents. 
/ Herbert Samuel /
Prejudice is a great time saver. You
can form opinions without having to
get the facts. 
/ E. B. White /
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that social and economic circumstances do
not constrain, in any relevant sense, the op-
portunities available to all members of
 society.
Second, it is not at all clear that the willing-
ness of all members in society to become
warriors is distributed evenly over all social
groups. There might be a significant pro-
portion of the majority who hold pacifist
convictions. If this is the case, members of
this social group neither will be motivated
to prepare for the competition nor will they
necessarily take part unless coerced to do so.
Therefore, although it might be the case that
fair conditions to prepare for the competi-
tion are given, if the willingness to become
a warrior is unevenly distributed in society,
it is very likely that a disproportional distri-
bution of warrior positions will be the result.
Only as many members of the majority can
be successful as are willing to apply for war-
rior positions. Since in a liberal order no one
would be ready to justify coercion to apply
for social positions in higher social and eco-
nomic strata of society, it seems to be more
reasonable to propose a less rigid, to wit a
weaker form of quotas.
This weaker form of quotas, “weak quotas”
for short, takes into account the fact that the
willingness to achieve positions of higher
and the highest social and economic strata
is unevenly distributed among the different
social groups in society. But it also assumes
that unjustified discrimination against some
social groups still occurs. Therefore, it must
be ensured that successful applicants from
the pool of candidates are proportional to
how many individuals have applied from the
different social groups in society.18 To use
Williams’s example once more, if it is the
case that for 120 positions as warriors 80
candidates from wealthy families and 160
from the poor majority of society apply, then
these 120 positions should be divided in a
ratio of 1:2. Forty warrior positions should
be assigned to candidates from wealthier
families, and 80 should go to candidates
from the poor majority. When such a distri-
bution does not occur, it could be argued
that unjustified discrimination is the case.
Thus, this understanding of quotas once
again presupposes the occurrence of unjus-
tified discrimination, but it takes for granted
that not all members of society are equally
willing to apply for warrior positions. Such
a justification of quotas, however, faces a fur-
ther difficulty which would also be faced by
rigid quotas. If it is demanded that a strict
proportional distribution of positions
among successful applicants must be se-
cured, then it might be the case that the po-
sitions would have to be assigned to
members of a particular social group even if
they are not as well qualified to fill the posi-
tions as applicants from other social groups.
This is the problem of reverse discrimina-
tion. To ensure a more proportional distri-
bution of positions, a selection procedure
would have to unjustifiably discriminate
against candidates from those social groups
which in the past were unjustifiably advan-
taged.19
This must be judged as an unjustified dis-
crimination, since what becomes relevant to
realise the requirements of weak quotas are
characteristics which are deemed irrelevant
for the successful performance of the posi-
tion. Discriminating against better qualified
candidates in the name of quotas means to
take into account characteristics such as gen-
der, ethnicity or religion, which, for exam-
ple, are not relevant for becoming a warrior.
Warriors need to display sufficient physical
condition. For physical condition, at least in
principle, gender, ethnicity and religion are
irrelevant. This holds true, however, only
when physical condition is not shaped in a
significant sense by these aspects of the can-
didates’ backgrounds. Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that gender, ethnicity and perhaps even
religious socialisation significantly constrain
the physical condition of candidates. But if
only physical strength is relevant for becom-
ing a warrior, then it becomes difficult to
argue that unjustified discrimination occurs
even if the distribution of warrior positions
is not proportional to the genders, ethnici-
ties and religious groups in the warrior
 society.
There are two further arguments, though, to
justify quotas which would not be in trouble
with this last challenge since they justify
quotas with a purpose beyond selection pro-
cedures for social positions. First, it can be
argued that role models are a suitable means
to change discriminatory attitudes in soci-
ety and to motivate members of disadvan-
taged social groups to apply for social
positions in higher social and economic
strata.20 According to this argument, quotas
are justified to create these role models to
reach both projected outcomes. Second, it
can be argued that quotas are a justified
means to enhance the quality of decisions
taken in higher ranked social positions. In
this sense, quotas are understood as a means
to improve the economy or society as a
whole.21 Neither of these arguments, how-
ever, necessarily justifies rigid or weak quo-
tas, since to be in accordance with these
demands it would also be appropriate to se-
lect in favour of disadvantaged social groups
if they are equally qualified for a social posi-
tion. This would be a claim for an even
weaker form of quotas than those discussed
above. For the purpose of this paper I will
name it “affirmative action”.22
Either way, whatever form of quotas we be-
lieve to be appropriate, I think they can only
be justified as a means to overcome unjusti-
fiably discriminatory selection procedures.
The main reason for this belief can be found
in the presumption I mentioned. For quotas
to be justified, more or less explicitly unjus-
tifiably discriminating practices must be in
place. If this condition is not given or at least
counterfactually presumed, it is not possible
to argue for quotas. If a selection procedure
is fair and does not display any explicit or
hidden form of unjustified discrimination,
then whatever distribution occurs must be
accepted as fair. Furthermore, the arguments
from role models and an improved economy
or society show that quotas are only justified
if they arrive at the projected goal. Role
models have to be an effective means to
change discriminatory attitudes in society
and more diversity in higher-ranked social
positions must be shown to be an appropri-
ate means to improve the economy or soci-
ety. This can certainly be correct, but it is
only under these conditions that quotas are
justified. And since these arguments take
quotas to be a means to reach these ends,
they are instruments – but seem not to be
normative goals in themselves.
In addition, arguing for proportional repre-
sentation of all social groups of society in all
different social and economic strata in soci-
ety presupposes that the willingness to apply
for these positions is evenly distributed
among all social groups. This makes it nec-
essary to ensure substantial conditions to se-
cure that neither social nor economic
differences have a significant impact on how
successful members of different social groups
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are in education and the job market. How-
ever, these conditions do not depend on the
distributive result but the pre-conditions se-
curing fair preparation for all to be success-
ful. Thus, they cannot justify quotas, but
they do justify an understanding of equality
of opportunity which also secures these con-
ditions. With these considerations in mind,
let us now turn to the question of how quo-
tas could become relevant in democracy. 
In what sense can quotas become 
relevant in democracy?
To address this question, it is necessary to be
clear about the proper role of quotas in such
an institutional regime. For this purpose, I
think it is helpful not to dig too deeply into
different understandings of what democracy
is and what institutional framework it de-
mands. I think it is enough to consider a
rather formal understanding of democracy
and, more specifically, of representative
democracy. As we will see in this section,
quotas are only appropriate if applied to po-
litical institutions and their offices but not
to policy decisions themselves. But what is
democracy and how can its institutional
framework be justified?
To understand what democracy is, it is help-
ful to introduce the description of demo-
cratic government expressed in Lincoln’s
famous phrase in his Gettysburg address that
democracy is “government of the people, by
the people, for the people.”23 Although it re-
mains unclear in Lincoln’s statement who
exactly legitimately constitute the people
and on what normative grounds one may be
considered part of the people, it clarifies how
political theorists usually understand
democracy. Democracy is an institutional
regime in which the whole citizen body, the
people of society, governs itself by making
and executing decisions and taking respon-
sibility for their consequences in a body. 
The liberal Western tradition of political the-
ory has found several different ways of nor-
matively justifying the right to democratic
government. What all these theories have in
common, however, is the presumption that
human beings are and have to be respected
as free and equal. To respect human beings
as free, their right to liberty cannot be re-
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stricted without giving them a say in the po-
litical process leading to such restrictions. To
respect them as equal, it is necessary to en-
sure fair chances for all to participate in this
decision-making process. How having a say
and a fair chance to participate in the deci-
sion-making process must be secured is a
matter of theoretical dispute. But nowadays,
it is almost impossible to defend any politi-
cal institutional framework without accept-
ing the right of all citizens to be respected as
free and equal.24 
Indeed, to argue for quotas it is necessary to
assume a more substantial goal of democracy
beyond securing formal conditions of free
and equal participation in political decision-
making. Without such a substantial goal it
becomes difficult to see what unjustified dis-
crimination in the process of democratic de-
cision-making means.25 Thomas Christiano
for example suggests that, in a democratic
regime, it must be assured that all human
beings are equally respected in their inter-
ests. This is only possible if all members of
society “on whom the rules [the policy deci-
sions] have a major impact” are equally in-
volved in determining the decision.26 It must
be possible for all to participate in political
decision-making, and they must be able to
see that their interests are respected; what is
necessary for policy decisions to be legiti-
mate, therefore, is their public justifiability.
Following Christiano, democracy is the best
institutional framework to guarantee this
condition of public scrutiny, at least par-
tially.27 In this sense then, a democratic in-
stitutional order not only secures formal
participation in collective decision-making
for all citizens but also serves the purpose of
balancing interests and of avoiding policy-
making biased in favour of some interests at
the cost of others. Thus, in democracy un-
justified discrimination means a tendency
for biased decisions in favour of some inter-
ests and neglecting certain others.
Following on from this, one would expect
that, provided the formal conditions to se-
cure free and equal citizenship are present,
repeated policy decisions will display the dif-
ferent interests existing in society propor-
tionally. In a society with ten pacifists and
five warriors, we expect that every third pol-
icy decision will be in favour of the warriors
whilst two of the three decisions are in
favour of pacifism. However, to argue that
quotas for the interests served by policy de-
cisions are appropriate if this is not the case
seems to be a misconception of what democ-
racy is. First, although democracy can be
viewed as a system to prevent biased policy,
it still remains a process of collective deci-
sion-making which ideally leads to consent
or compromise about what is in the com-
mon interest of all members of society. Sec-
ond, according to Lincoln’s description of
democracy as “government of the people, by
the people, for the people” it must be the cit-
izen body that decides in its own right. Any
substantial criteria prescribing in what pro-
portion policy decisions have to display ex-
isting interests in society would be in
conflict with this description of democracy.
According to these two arguments, there-
fore, it seems to be inappropriate to apply
quotas to policy decisions themselves. It is
more reasonable to apply them to the com-
position of political bodies steering a  society.
If it is the composition of the political bod-
ies of democracy to which quotas must be
applied, we have to understand in what way
it can be justified that only a certain number
of citizens fill the relevant offices. I think
here it again proves helpful to return to Lin-
coln’s description of democracy as “govern-
ment of the people, by the people, for the
people.” According to this statement, policy
decisions in a democracy are legitimate only
on the condition that it is the whole citizen
body that governs in its own right. Whether
a model of democracy is a model of direct
or representative democracy depends on
whether the whole citizen body or only part
of it is conceived as necessary to make pol-
icy decisions.28 Models of direct democracy
argue that the people who should make pol-
icy decisions must be coextensive with the
whole citizen body. In representative democ-
racy, the assembly making policy decisions
can be smaller. Thus, to capture the under-
standing of representative democracy, Lin-
coln’s phrase needs a slight reformulation:
democracy is government of all the people,
by some representatives of the people, for all
the people. Representative institutions thus
understood are an institutional way to oper-
ationalise the process of collective decision-
making among all the people so as to make
it more efficient and even, according to
some views, qualitatively better.29
According to this formal description of rep-
resentative democracy, legitimate represen-
tation must take into account all interests
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present in the citizen body.30 Furthermore,
the members of the legislative assembly must
be accountable to the people forming the
citizen body since they should decide in the
name of the citizen body as a whole. In
democracy, accountability is usually ensured
by election cycles, because these allow those
representatives who performed well in rep-
resenting interests to be re-elected and those
who performed badly to be deselected.31
Thus, representation in democracy can only
be legitimate if it is supported by the inter-
ests actually present in the citizen body.
Therefore, the function of the legislative as-
sembly is to represent the interests present
in proportion to their weight in the citizen
body. The function of an individual repre-
sentative, by contrast, is to stand or act for
those whom he or she represents. This
means that, in a society with 1,000 pacifists
and 500 warriors, an assembly of six indi-
viduals would be legitimate if it contained
four representatives of the pacifists and two
representatives of the warriors. In conse-
quence, it can be argued that in representa-
tive democracy, unjustified discrimination
occurs if such proportional representation of
interests is absent or, at least, if certain in-
terests are permanently marginalised.
The legislative assembly is certainly the most
obvious institution in a democratic frame-
work to proportionally represent the inter-
ests of the citizen body, since in the end all
policy decisions must be confirmed by this
institution. However, it is not only the leg-
islative assembly which has a major impact
on how the interests of the citizen body are
taken into account and enforced. Executive,
judiciary and administrative bodies also have
significant impact. Since the legislative as-
sembly must represent the present interests
in society proportionally, and these other in-
stitutions have a major impact on how well
they are translated into policy, then these in-
stitutions would also have to fulfil this rep-
resentative requirement. 
But there are two practical reasons why the
legislative assembly is not only the most im-
portant but also the most plausible political
body for which to demand proportional rep-
resentation of interests. Admittedly, these
reasons do not exclude a justification of a
proportional representation of interests in
executive, judiciary and administrative bod-
ies.
First, with regard to the judiciary and the ad-
ministrative body, individuals in these offices
not only have to be regarded by the citizens
to best represent their interests. For success-
ful performance in these offices, other com-
petences are needed. Lawyers need to have
sufficient knowledge of jurisprudence; a spe-
cific function in the administrative body de-
mands specific qualifications for its
fulfilment. Therefore, it would not only be
the case that those filling these offices have
to perform well in representing interests
present in the citizen body but they must
also display the relevant competences. How
this necessity of competence should be bal-
anced with the fact that individuals filling
these positions should also serve certain in-
terests is a complicated question that I can-
not answer here. 
Second, there is a different practical diffi-
culty with regard to the executive. Executive
offices are not as numerous as seats in the
legislative assembly. This makes it difficult
to demand that executive organs should rep-
resent all interests present in society propor-
tionally. However, if a society is divided into
large ethnic, religious, linguistic or geo-
graphic groups with conflicting interests, it
seems reasonable to argue at least for pro-
portional representation of these groups in
society. But this makes it necessary to be
clear about the relevance of these groups and
their interests. To justify the proportional
representation of interests in the executive
organs, it has to be shown why the conflict-
ing interests of certain social groups bear
such high relevance that the executive
should be divided accordingly. This is a cen-
tral question to be clarified in the next sec-
tion, in which I try to answer the question
whether youth quotas can be justified.
Against the background of the considera-
tions concerning democracy thus far, we can
now see in what sense quotas can become
relevant in a democracy. They can become
relevant to ensure that all interests in the cit-
izen body are represented proportionally.
Quotas can be seen as justified means if it
becomes apparent that some interests are
permanently marginalised within election
procedures for the legislative assembly or se-
lection procedures for other offices in other
democratic institutions. Such marginalisa-
tion represents a sort of unjustified discrim-
ination against those holding these interests.
However, as we have seen in the last section,
this does not mean that quotas are a justi-
fied normative goal in themselves. They are
only justified as a means to prevent more or
less explicit unjustified discrimination in the
election and selection procedures for the of-
fices in question. If no such discrimination
occurs, whatever distribution of offices re-
sults must be accepted as legitimate. Fur-
thermore, since in a democracy these
procedures are the only way of legitimising
the representation of interests, the resulting
distribution of offices has to be accepted as
proportionally representing the interests in
society.
Can youth quotas be justified?
As I have introduced the relevance of quotas
in democracy thus far, they are only justified
as a means to bring about election and se-
lection procedures which do not unjustifi-
ably discriminate against some interests in
society. This makes it necessary that a mar-
ginalisation of some interests is actually oc-
curring. If this is not the case, then it is not
possible to argue for quotas. To assess
whether in democracy quotas for the young
can be justified to ensure appropriate repre-
sentation of their interests, we need to deal
with another complication. It must be pos-
sible to show that the young indeed consti-
tute a relevant social group with specific
interests. Otherwise, it becomes difficult to
argue for youth quotas as a means to ensure
policy-making that is less biased against the
young.
In light of Vanhuysse’s study, it seems rea-
sonable to argue that the young are margin-
alised in their interests. In addition, due to
demographic development and the concep-
tual condition that democracies have to be
responsive to the interests of the citizen
body, it is also reasonable to assume that
democracies tend to favour the interests of
the old rather than the interests of the
young. Both these empirical arguments jus-
tify the conclusion that democracies tend to
marginalise, to wit unjustifiably discriminate
against, the interests of the young. However,
this argument only holds under the condi-
tion that the young applying for offices are
or have unjustifiably been discriminated
against in the selection or election proce-
dures for the offices in question. If this were
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not the case, then quotas as a means to bring
about non-discriminatory election or selec-
tion procedures could not be justified.
If this pre-condition is a given, then it is pos-
sible to explore further whether and under
what conditions youth quotas can be justi-
fied. As mentioned above with regard to ex-
ecutive bodies, to argue for quotas for
specific social groups in democracy makes it
necessary to specify which kinds of social
groups can become relevant here. According
to the definition of democracy I draw on
here, it seems to be unjustifiable to make
mere membership of a social group more rel-
evant for the right to proportional represen-
tation than the interests present in society
potentially crossing the borders of these so-
cial groups. In consequence, to argue for
proportional representation of social groups
rather than the weight of interests present in
society, it must be possible to show that
membership in a social group is a necessary
condition for representing the special inter-
ests of that social group. Furthermore, it
must be the case that a social group is suffi-
ciently homogeneous to be ascribed certain
specific interests which are not represented
by non-members of these groups.32
This challenge is especially pertinent con-
sidering the young as a social group. It is not
at all clear that being young is a necessary
and sufficient condition to have certain spe-
cific interests, for the two following reasons.
First, similarly to other social groups divided
according to gender, ethnicity, language or
geography, it is difficult to show that mem-
bership of such a group is sufficient to de-
note certain specific interests. Second, the
interests that the young will have will highly
depend on their various social, economic,
cultural and educational backgrounds. These
backgrounds will not necessarily lead to a set
of interests shared by all who are young but
to various kinds of interests not specifically
linked to their age. Therefore it becomes dif-
ficult to argue that being young is a signifi-
cant condition to represent specific interests.
However, if we take into account that it is
not interests by themselves which ground
specific political opinions and ideals but the
discourses within which one is involved, it
is possible to argue that the young form a
social group united enough to justify their
proportional representation. John Dryzek
and Simon Niemeyer have argued in this di-
rection.33 According to them, what is rele-
vant in democracy is not that interests are
proportionally represented but discourses,
because discourses are the basis on which in-
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terests are formed. Since the young have
their own specific discourses, it seems to be
plausible that they form a social group that
can be represented proportionally. They have
their own way to communicate and articu-
late their hopes and fears, and they consider
political challenges their own way. If one ar-
gues along these lines, therefore, it becomes
possible to view the young as a relevant so-
cial group to be represented proportionally.34
Once the young or other groups are estab-
lished as relevant social groups to be repre-
sented proportionally, a further difficulty
arises. For their representation to be legiti-
mate, that is to say not in conflict with Lin-
coln’s description of democracy, social
groups can only demand representation in
proportion to their weight in the citizen
body. Larger social groups or parts of society
are entitled to more weight in political bod-
ies than smaller groups. The reason for this
is simply that representation of interests in
democracy must be proportional to the
weight these groups have in society. To argue
for more than such proportional representa-
tion would need further arguments leading
beyond the relevance of quotas in democ-
racy I have argued for thus far. Thus, ac-
cording to the justification of quotas up to
now, quotas to ensure non-discriminatory
selection and election procedures for offices
can demand nothing more than the propor-
tional representation of discourses or inter-
ests and, if possible to justify, of social
groups. This challenge proves to be espe-
cially pertinent with regard to quotas for the
young, since their justification not only
stems from the fact that their discourses tend
to be marginalised but also because demo-
graphic development reinforces their mar-
ginalisation. Quotas, as justified thus far,
cannot solve this problem. This shows why it
is especially important to carefully assess
which form of quotas would be most ap-
propriate for the young. 
With regard to the three different forms of
quotas discussed in the second section, it is
not at all clear that quotas in democracy
should always be rigid. Which form of quo-
tas is appropriate depends on circumstances
and especially on the motivation of mem-
bers of social groups. Rigid quotas are only
justified if the groups to be represented pro-
portionally can always nominate enough
candidates to effectively fill the positions. If
this is not the case, rigid quotas would de-
mand coercive practices for those groups
which are not able to nominate enough can-
didates to conform to the proportional re-
quirement. As in the case for rigid quotas
with regard to equality of opportunity, this
makes it seem more plausible to propose
weak quotas which only demand that the
different relevant groups are elected and se-
lected in a proportional way from those ap-
plying for offices. 
How effective such weak quotas can be to
transfer interests into policy, however, de-
pends on the weight of those groups for
which proportional representation is ensured
by quotas. If a social group does not have
enough weight to significantly influence pol-
icy decisions, quotas for proportional repre-
sentation cannot serve the purpose for which
they are proposed. Although quotas can serve
small minorities to better voice their inter-
ests (stemming from their discourses), it is
not at all clear that this has a relevant impact
on the policy decisions taken.35
With these considerations in mind, we see
that in certain circumstances political affir-
mative action programmes and securing sub-
stantial assistance for political activity prove
more promising than rigid or weak quotas.
Political affirmative action programmes
would demand that whenever two candidates
or parties gain the same or similar votes, the
candidate or party belonging to a disadvan-
taged social group, or proposing more candi-
dates from these groups, is preferred.
Substantive assistance, on the other hand,
would mean that potentially marginalised so-
cial groups are assisted by society in their de-
velopment of political programmes and
financially to be able to voice their views on
an equal footing with those interest groups
which are economically better situated.36 Both
measures would not only increase the likeli-
hood that the interests of these minorities are
heard; they would also allow these minorities
to gain more political influence than they
would be proportionally entitled to, since if
minorities are able to better voice their beliefs,
this also increases the likelihood of their po-
litical success when applying for offices. 
I think that – especially for the young – both
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these kinds of measures will prove the most
promising. Political affirmative action pro-
grammes will provide incentives for older
political leaders and parties to support the
young in their political career earlier and
with more intensity than they tend to do
now. With political affirmative action pro-
grammes it becomes interesting for parties
to have younger candidates on their lists
since that increases the likelihood of being
successful in cases in which they have equal
or similar citizen support than other parties.
Furthermore, if candidates on the lists are
elected individually, political affirmative ac-
tion programmes enhance the chance of
gathering more seats. In any case in which
two candidates, from whatever party they
are, gain an equal or similar number of
votes, the younger candidate will be given
advantage. Substantial assistance for the
young, by contrast, would allow the young
to politically organise and to campaign for
their interests in a way they would not be
able to without this help, since it is certainly
a fact that older people have more experi-
ence in how to organise and have more
 capital at their disposal for political cam-
paigning.
Taken together, the considerations of this
section allow the following conclusions.
Quotas for social groups can be justified in
democracy if there is marginalisation or un-
justified discrimination of the specific inter-
ests or discourses of these groups. This
presupposes that specific interests or dis-
courses and the ability to voice them are suf-
ficiently closely linked with being a member
of that social group in question. Against this
backdrop, quotas for the young can be jus-
tified since the young are obviously discrim-
inated against, and if they in fact constitute
a discrete social group. Whether rigid or
weak quotas or political affirmative action
programmes would better serve the purpose
of avoiding the marginalisation of the young
and other social groups, however, remains a
question to be answered depending on the
motivation for political action of members
of a social group and especially on the kind
of social group in question. In the case of the
young, I suggested, political affirmative ac-
tion programmes and substantial assistance
might prove more effective than rigid or
weak quotas.
Are quotas a means to avoid future 
disasters?
Thus far, I have argued that quotas for the
young can be justified, but that what form
of quotas is appropriate depends on circum-
stances. If enough young people are moti-
vated to engage in politics, then rigid quotas
for representative bodies can be justified. To
avoid potential coercion to fulfil this pro-
portional requirement, however, it seems
more appropriate to propose weak quotas.
Furthermore, since young people tend to be
outnumbered due to demographic develop-
ment, it might be better to adopt political
affirmative action programmes favouring
young candidates whenever they have equal
or similar votes to older candidates. These
programmes would allow a greater shift in
political influence to the young than their
number in society. However, whatever form
of quotas is adopted, can they ensure that
not only the interests and discourses of the
young are better represented but also that
the goal of more long-term policy-making is
addressed?
To begin with, there are two obvious reasons
to doubt that this question can be answered
in the affirmative. First, it is not necessarily
membership of a social group that makes in-
dividuals better suited to represent particu-
lar interests or discourses.37 It is not only
warriors who can represent the interests of
warriors. Pacifists can do the same if they
care sufficiently enough for the interest of,
say, adequate housing for warriors. And war-
riors can certainly represent the interests of
pacifists if they argue against the duty to be-
come a warrior. Thus, although the concerns
Vanhuysse expresses are concerns of the
young, it is not at all clear that young citi-
zens will care for them once in office. It is
far from certain that young representatives
will represent their interests in lowering pub-
lic debt and sustainable policy-making.
Young people might be preoccupied with
other things – things which are relevant to
their current situation of life. Therefore, it
might be the case that older people will take
better care of what is in the long-term inter-
ests of the young. This makes it possible to
conclude that quotas do not necessarily serve
the purpose of ensuring more sustainable
policy-making. 
Second, as argued in the last section, if quo-
tas only serve the purpose of ensuring pro-
portional representation and outweigh the
marginalisation of interests or discourses,
then greater representation of social groups
than their proportion in society cannot be
justified. Since, due to demographic devel-
opment, the young are increasingly a mi-
nority, there is no guarantee that their
proportional representation will alter policy
decisions in a significant way. This might
even be the case if political affirmative ac-
tion programmes are adopted, because they
leave it open to whether the young will be
successful in transferring their interests into
policy. Thus, even though the young might
care strongly about long-term policy-mak-
ing and their proportional representation al-
lows them to better voice their beliefs, it is
not a given that quotas will lead to more sus-
tainable policy decisions. 
In light of these two arguments, to enhance
the capacity of the young to ensure long-
term decision-making, it seems more ap-
propriate to bring further arguments to
justify quotas in democracy than those pro-
vided up to now. Two of these further argu-
ments rely on two justifications of quotas
introduced in section two, both leading be-
yond the goal of ensuring non-discrimina-
tory selection procedures. First, parallel to
the argument for role models, it could be ar-
gued that quotas could serve the purpose of
motivating members of disadvantaged
groups to engage more in politics, since once
some members of a social group are elected
they could serve as role models. If these role
models care for sustainable policy-making or
lowering public debt, then the young as a
group might care more for these questions
and influence policy-making accordingly.
Second, it could be argued in favour of quo-
tas that more diversity in political bodies en-
hances the quality of policy decisions,
whatever they might be. Third, and going
beyond the arguments introduced in section
two, it would also be possible to argue that
the long-term impacts of policy decisions
taken today would be better legitimised if
those who have to bear them shared pro-
portional decisive weight.
What we must be clear about in applying
these arguments, however, is that they shift
the purpose that quotas should serve. As I
have discussed up to now, youth quotas have
been justified as a means to prevent or avoid
marginalisation or unjustified discrimina-
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tion of the young as a social group. In con-
trast, quotas in these arguments become a
means to different ends. Quotas for the sake
of role models are a means of achieving more
political sensitivity, and if these role models
care for long-term interests, then they can
enhance awareness of these challenges. In
the case of the second argument, quotas are
introduced as a means of enhancing the
quality of policy decisions. More diversity, it
is argued, will lead to more creative policy
outcomes and to decisions that better mirror
what is in the common interest.38Third, bet-
ter representation of the young can serve as
a means to better guarantee the legitimacy
of policy decisions and their long-term im-
pacts.
As plausible as these arguments sound by
themselves, I do not think that they can jus-
tify more than proportional representation
of social groups. Whatever purpose role
models are able to serve, quotas are only jus-
tifiable in a democracy up to the point at
which positions are filled in relation to the
proportion that interests or discourse are
present in society. To demand more would
mean to subvert the ideal of democracy as I
have expressed it in this paper. The same is
true with regard to the argument that quo-
tas might help enhance the quality of policy
decisions. Although it might be correct that
more diversity enhances the quality of policy
decisions, demanding more than propor-
tional representation of social groups would
once again mean subverting the idea of le-
gitimate representation in democracy. These
considerations become especially relevant
with regard to the last argument since, if
quotas are a means to enhance the legiti-
macy of the long-term impacts of policy de-
cisions, then they have to be proportional.
According to Lincoln’s description of
democracy, to argue for quotas in any other
sense would be illegitimate.
Furthermore, these three additional argu-
ments in favour of quotas also face the sec-
ond challenge mentioned above. It is not
necessarily the case that young role models
will care about those interests denoted by
Vanhuysse as the interests of the young. And
although more diversity might lead to a bet-
ter quality of policy decisions, it must re-
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main an open question what such better
quality would be. In democracy, it must be
the citizen body as a whole who should de-
cide what good policy decisions are, since it
is the political body which is accountable to
itself. Any qualitative criteria prescribing
how a society has to decide would be in con-
flict with the conditions of legitimacy in
democracy. Therefore, although propor-
tional representation of the young might en-
hance the legitimacy of long-term impacts
of policy decisions taken today, this does not
mean that the decisions must and will fur-
ther be specific and especially long-term
goals.
With regard to the last additional argument
for quotas, there is at least one reason which
only justifies a qualified “No” to answer the
second question I have investigated here.
Since the long-term consequences of policy
decisions have to be borne by today’s young,
enhancing their legitimacy is important.
Those who have to bear these long-term
consequences should also have appropriate
weight in deciding whether or not to take
the risks involved in these decisions. This
makes it reasonable to argue that youth quo-
tas are justified because they enhance the le-
gitimacy of long-term policy consequences.
But they cannot be justified with regard to
any substantial policy goal, such as lowering
public debt or sustainability. Once again,
whether enhanced legitimacy in this sense is
best realised via rigid or weak quotas or via
political affirmative action programmes de-
pends on how the motivation for political
engagement is distributed among the young.
As argued in the last section, with regard to
demographic development, there is good
reason to argue for the last and weakest form
of quotas in combination with substantial
political assistance for the young. If the
young are successful in politics, both of these
measures would facilitate more than the pro-
portional political influence of the young,
which would enhance the legitimacy of the
long-term impacts of policy decisions taken
today.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued for four conclu-
sions. First, quotas are not normative goals
in themselves but only a means: first and
foremost a means to ensure the absence of
more or less hidden unjustified discrimina-
tion. Second, in democracy, quotas are most
plausibly used as a means to fill offices in
those bodies which have a major impact on
how well interests or discourses are trans-
lated into policy. Quotas for the legislative
assembly are therefore the most important.
Third, quotas for the young can be justified
since, due to demographic development,
their discourses tend to be marginalised.
What form of quotas is most appropriate to
serve this purpose remains an open question.
Which form best serves their better integra-
tion in the political process depends on the
motivation of the young for political en-
gagement. I suggested that political affirma-
tive action programmes together with
substantial political assistance for the young
might prove most promising. Fourth, quotas
cannot be justified as a means to ensure
long-term policy-making, but they can en-
sure better legitimacy of the long-term im-
pacts of policy decisions taken today. In the
light of challenges such as high public debts,
environmental disasters and climate change,
it is this last argument which best justifies
quotas for the young.
Notes
1 See Vanhuysse 2013.
2 Thompson 2010: 18-20.
3 I draw here on Vanhuysse 2013, 23-24.
Interestingly enough, demographic develop-
ment and an increasing number of older
people do not have only negative effects. As
Dyson 2012 shows, the ageing of the citizen
body tends to increase democratisation.
4 Thompson 2010: 26-30.
5 Another example to understand the role
of representatives of future generations is
provided by Ekeli 2005.
6 Vanhuysse 2013, 41-43.
7 For a critical normative assessment of this
and other proposals to secure intergenera-
tional justice in democracy, see van Parijs
1998. 
8 I explain in the section headed “In what
sense can quotas become relevant in democ-
racy” what I understand by “political affir-
mative action programmes”. In short, they
select candidates from disadvantaged social
groups for offices if they gain equal or simi-
lar voting power, rather than a candidate
from an advantaged social group.
9 For a helpful overview of the debate see
Rössler 1993.
10 For a more developed argument to jus-
tify my view see Wallimann-Helmer 2013:
esp. chap. 2. 
11 See Sher 1988. 
12 Warren 1977: 245-249.
13 O’Neill 1976: 338.
14 O’Neill 1976: 339-340.
15 Williams 1973: 244.
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16 O’Neill 1976: 339-340.
17 Rawls 1971: 73-74.
18 Warren 1977: 251-253.
19 For two classical texts discussing reverse
discrimination see Newton 1973 and
Dworkin 1977: 269-288.
20 This argument has been made in various
forms. The first philosopher stating it was,
to the best of my knowledge, Thomson
1973.
21 One of the recent statements of this ar-
gument with regard to education is provided
by Anderson 2007.
22 In calling this weakest form of quotas “af-
firmative action” I come close to at least
some aspects of what Pojman discussed
under the label “weak quotas” (Pojman
1998). However, I am also aware that “affir-
mative action” broadly understood could de-
note any kind of preferential treatment of
disadvantaged social groups, which is not
necessarily linked with the idea of quotas.
23 See Brooks Lapsley 2012.
24 Kymlicka 2002: 3f.
25 Of course in democratic theory it is a
contested issue whether democracy should
be understood only in procedural or also in
more substantive terms (e.g. Buchanan
2002; Brettschneider 2005; Christiano
2004; Brettschneider 2005, 2007; van Parijs
2011). In this paper it is not possible to jus-
tify the view that genuine democracy should
also incorporate a more substantive goal.
However, as should become clear in the fol-
lowing, a more substantive goal of democ-
racy like the one suggested by Christiano is
a necessary presumption in order to make
possible an argument for quotas in democ-
racy. I would like to thank Nenad Stojanovic
for raising this issue.
26 Christiano 2010: 56.
27 Christiano 2004: 275.
28 Christiano 2010: 246.
29 See e.g. Christiano 2010: 105; Pettit
2004: 60-62; Dobson 1997: 127.
30 See Dovi 2011; Mansbridge 2003.
31 See Rehfeld 2006.
32 A more developed discussion of this
problem can be found in Stojanovic 2013:
133-140.
33 See Dryzek/Niemeyer 2008.
34 In addition, an argument along these
lines implies that one would have to alter the
understanding of democracy and its relevant
representative institutions overall. It would
not only have to be the discourse of the
young which would have to be represented
proportionally; it would also have to be all
kinds of discourses present in society and
not interests.
35 Dryzek and Niemeyer by contrast argue
that the frequency with which interests can
be and are voiced have a major impact on
policy decisions (Dryzek/Niemeyer 2008:
484). If one assumes that voiced beliefs alter
political discourse, then – irrespective of the
proportion of society minorities constitute
– any kind of proportional representation
will improve their situation. However, al-
though voicing beliefs can have an impact
on the formation of policy decisions when
the chips are down, for final decisions the
decisive power still lies with the larger social
groups and not minorities.
36 Such a proposal along these lines is for
example made by Young 1990. 
37 Mansbridge 1999: 638.
38 For this argument see for example
Dryzek/Niemeyer 2008: 484; Young 1990.
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bstract: Quotas, including youth quo-
tas for representative institutions, are
usually evaluated from within the so-
cial justice discourse. That discourse relies on
several questionable assumptions, seven of
which I critically address and radically revise in
this contribution from a libertarian perspec-
tive. Temporal justice then takes on an entirely
different form. It becomes a theory in which re-
sponsibilities are clear and cannot be shifted
onto the shoulders of the weak and innocent. I
shall only briefly sketch some outlines and gen-
eral implications of such a theory, arguing that
tive facts but also about actual and potential
support and resistance.2 Adequate represen-
tation can take many forms, but in a classic
typology Hanna Pitkin distinguished two
types that are definitive of a fundamental
dilemma for democracies: representation as
acting for versus representation as standing
for.3
Representation as acting for demands that
representatives defend the opinions and fur-
ther the interests of whomever it is they
 represent. While perhaps in an ideal democ-
racy, the representative can be expected to
it offers too little guidance for our imperfect
world. While that implies more tolerance for
quotas, I nevertheless propose an alternative
more suited to a representative, deliberative
democracy: veto rights.
Representation, justice, and youth 
quotas1
No political system, democratic or other,
can function successfully without some de-
gree of representative consultation, for
starters because politics must be based on
adequate information not just about objec-
Temporal Justice, Youth Quotas and Libertarianism
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